The Mexican Revolution of 1910
Considered as a Social Movement
1910-1917

By L. Marx Renzulli*

"The Mexican drama is the Drama of a gigantic crime . . . the disinheritance of a nation . . . ."

Regeneración
December 23, 1916

The Mexican Revolution, initiated against President Porfirio Díaz in 1910, represented a new note in Latin American politics. Distinguished from previous, and numerous, cuartelazos, coup d'états, and other forms of military intervention which all too often have accompanied a change of government in Mexico, the Revolution of 1910 was a movement in which "to an appreciable degree social institutions and practices were turned over and not just the political 'ins' turned out."¹ In this respect, the Revolution was a true one in its aims as well as in its results. Although this internal explosion which shook Mexico in the first decade of the twentieth century was in part due to political ambitions that had been thwarted throughout the thirty-four years of Díaz's dictatorship, the great underlying motivation was social and economic unrest in Mexico. The upheaval in 1910 has been called the battle of three ages: serfdom, capitalism, and industrial freedom.² Mexico entered the conflict as a feudal society and emerged more nearly socialistic and equalitarian than many of her sister states in the Western Hemisphere.

The Mexican Revolution as a whole was anonymous and was not responsive to any plan. It was a "magnificent gesture of disorganized intolerance."³ Although the revolt was essentially the work of the common people, its program was incidental and pragmatic throughout. No organized party presided at its birth; neither were there great intellectuals to formulate its doctrine and outline its objectives. The great names that are associated with the Revolution

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were but the instruments of a movement which they did not make and were barely able to guide.\textsuperscript{4}

The Revolution that Francisco I. Madero initiated on November 20, 1910, was frankly and immediately concerned with political democracy, overthrow of the regime being the urgent goal. It was moreover, an attempt to incite a middle class revolt. Madero’s Plan of San Luis Potosí issued the month before, did not fully correspond to the needs of Mexico in 1910. The Plan did not mention the labor problem; neither was there a pledge of expropriation, nor a commitment made to divide the land. The 2500 word program contained but one paragraph on the agrarian problem, which was the fundamental social and economic disequilibrium that both provoked and became the pivotal issue of the Revolution. Restitution of lands to proprietors who had been despoiled of their holdings through abuses of the \textit{Ley de Terrenos} was promised; other more sweeping economic acts were only to be hoped for by the masses of common people, who were supporting the Revolution.\textsuperscript{5} It was the fear that the lower class would gain only an empty victory by following the Madero standard that led \textit{Regeneración}, the organ of the Mexican Liberal Party, to announce the following in its editorial of December 17, 1910:

\begin{quote}
The Liberal Party has not joined hands with the Maderists. It has not endorsed and will not endorse either Madero or his program. The Liberal Party is a working class movement. If it triumphs it will proceed at once to returning the stolen lands of the people to their rightful owners. The Maderist Party would merely restore the republican constitution. It would not break up the haciendas, which are one of the chief bulwarks of the slavery and peonage under which at least one-third of our people are living. We believe that the time has passed for middle class revolutions. The revolution of the Liberal Party will be a working class revolution.\textsuperscript{6}
\end{quote}

This attitude of non-support for “middle class revolutions” on the part of \textit{Regeneración}, published in Los Angeles by the exiled Flores Magón brothers, was the result of centuries of economic subjugation of the lower classes by the rich \textit{hacendados}, and of countless broken promises, betrayals, and desertions by the middle class, who used the peasants to ride into power and then promptly forgot them. The Mágons and their supporters had already paid dearly for their courageous, if uncompromising, stand. In an article entitled “Mexicans, rise up to war!” they concluded that “three years of forced labor in the penitentiary have but tempered our character like a blade of steel. The lash whips us into rebellion, not into submission.” Time was to prove that their fear of yet another middle class
betrayal was not completely ungrounded. No sooner had Madero's revolution triumphed than issues of *Regeneración* sent into Mexico were confiscated and suppressed. Ricardo Flores Magón called for both political and economic liberty, and his statement that "one is not effective without the other," would serve only to push Madero further than he and his family wanted to go.

Although agrarian reform was not the principal aim set forth by Madero in the Plan of San Luis Potosí, it was for the masses of people the most fundamental part of his program. It made the greatest appeal. Of "effective suffrage and no re-election" the *peon* and the village farmer knew little and cared less; but the cry of "Tierra y Libertad" awakened a ready response. Many knew what the phrase meant, for they had only recently lost their *ejidos*. Prior to 1890 the *ejidos*, or communal village lands, constituted the principal means of support for the majority of the Indians in Mexico, giving them a measure of self-sufficiency and independence. During the Díaz dictatorship, however, most of these lands were alienated from the peasants and fell into the hands of foreign speculators or Mexican *hacendados*. Over ninety percent of the villages on the central plateau of Mexico were deprived of their communal lands, and according to the census of 1910 about 3,103,402 Indians had lost both their freedom and their land. They were listed as *peones de campo*, or agricultural laborers held in debt service. By the end of the Díaz regime, grants of land amounted to over 180,000,000 acres, one-third of the area of Mexico. Many Indians knew little of what it meant to have a plot of soil that they could call their own; they were unable to remember back to the time when their families had not been indebted bondsmen. Few will disagree with the statement that the agrarian system was responsible for the conditions which made the upheaval possible. It was indeed an agrarian revolution at the base.

It would be a mistake to assume, however, that the agrarian problem was the sole cause of the Revolution of 1910. Several other factors are equally as important if considered as a precipitating force. The repercussion on Mexican life of Mexican emigration to the United States in the latter years of the Díaz regime showed the lower classes that some other way of life was possible; they became aware of the contrast between their own situation and that of other classes. Ambitions were thus stirred and hopes revived. The Mexican emigrants who returned also brought with them new ideas concerning a just standard of living. The opportunity of escape from the hacienda offered by the new industries, especially the railroads,
and by higher wages, created social reverberations and adjustments that made for greater mobility and flux at the turn of the century. Along with this relatively rapid industrialization, and in contrast to the higher wages it offered, the wages of the agricultural laborers remained stationary or declined between 1900 and 1910, thus impressing on the hacienda peón the difference between his static situation and that of the more fortunate laborers who had escaped to the mines, railroads, and city factories. Lastly, the growing discontent and the distress after 1900 was accelerated by creeping inflation. Prices began to outrun wages thus increasing the discontent of the peones on the one hand and thwarting the hopes of the new industrial laboring class on the other. It is not difficult to understand why the peones grasped at the one chance for agrarian reform that Madero offered them in the Plan of San Luis Potosí. They had absolutely nothing to lose. Although many have held that the following plank in Madero’s Plan “was merely ‘molasses to catch flies,’” it revealed at least the germ of Carranza’s famous decree of 1915:

In abuse of the law on public lands numerous proprietors of small holdings, in their greater part Indians, have been dispossessed of their lands by rulings of the department of public development or by decisions of the tribunals of the Republic. As it is just to restore to their former owners the lands of which they were dispossessed in such an arbitrary manner, such rulings and decisions are declared subject to revision, and those who have acquired them in such an immoral manner, or their heirs, will be required to restore them to their former owners, to whom they shall also pay an indemnity for the damages suffered.

The Liberal Party, expressing its opinion through Regeneración, gave the Revolution its “heartiest endorsement” and wished it success, but added that “we wish it to succeed as a Liberal revolution and not as a middle class revolution. In other words, we are not satisfied with Madero’s program.... It will be our aim to see that... the revolution shall be dominated by Liberal ideas and by Liberals.” Feeling that Madero’s social and economic program did not go far enough, Regeneración called for the following platform:

1. An increase in the number of primary schools, and compulsory, lay education to age 14.
2. Suppression of Church schools, nationalization of Church lands, and payment of taxes by the Church.
3. All property-owning foreigners to lose their former nationality and become citizens of Mexico.
4. A maximal workday of eight hours, a minimum pay of $1.00 per day, and workmen’s compensation for laborers.
5. All land to be kept under production, with unproductive land to revert to the state.
6. Creation of an agricultural bank to loan money to poor farmers at low interest.
7. Confiscation of the property of present rulers, to be re-distributed to the Indians.\textsuperscript{15}

The editors held that “a maximal work day of eight hours and a minimum pay of $1 is the least that can be pretended to make the laborer safe and secure from poverty,” to keep him from getting exhausted by fatigue, and to give him the time for educational and recreational diversion after work. The ideal, they held, was not to gain a dollar a day. “What is aimed at most is to cut the root of abuses of which the laboring man has been a victim, and to place him in conditions which will enable him to struggle against capital in a not absolutely disadvantageous position.”\textsuperscript{16} To the farmers, \textit{Regeneración} tendered the following advice:

\begin{quote}
Destroy, but take care to remove the debris, to uproot the foundation. Crush by action the so-called right of property, but not that you shall possess yourselves individually with that which your masters now have, since then you will convert yourself into a master, you will oppress your brothers and you will be as much a robber and as evil as those who exploit you now. Your liberation ought to be a part of the liberation of all human beings. The land which is to be taken away from the bourgeois ought not to be for you alone . . . but for all without distinction of sex.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

The Revolution, \textit{Regeneración} added, “is not Madero’s revolution. The revolution goes on without Madero. While Madero precipitated it, he will not be able to control the revolution. The people will take as much of his program as they want and no more.”\textsuperscript{18}

Madero began his term as president torn between conservative and revolutionary forces. Although he “leaned more to the side of the revolution,” he did not completely recognize the urgency of meeting the demands of the revolution. He regarded his election as the triumph of a political movement, and this position allowed the Liberals to accuse him of transforming the economic revolution into a political reform crusade.\textsuperscript{19} “Time has demonstrated,” wrote Ricardo Flores Magón, “that if there is one thing truly ‘impossible’ it is the achievement of economic liberty by the ballot.”\textsuperscript{20} Accusing Madero of eating out of “Wall Street’s hand” and joining “forces with De la Barra and Reyes to put down the proletariat,” Magón declared that “the people want something that is exceedingly definite—the abolition of hunger; and inasmuch as the electoral ballot is not made of flour but of paper it seeks something more substantial: Bread.”\textsuperscript{21}

Such bitter attacks against Madero continued throughout his term as President. Whatever may have been Madero’s understanding
of or attitude toward the agrarian problem, a number of his supporters and other leaders in the revolutionary movement were not slow to realize the importance of agrarian reform. Soon after Madero's call to revolt was issued in October, 1910, Juan Sarabia and Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama submitted a project for a law which not only called for the restoration of illegally usurped lands, but definitely proposed that villages again be given the right to hold and exploit ejidos. It also proposed the expropriation of lands near villages for the creation of new ejidos, and the setting of definite limits on the amount of private property any individual could own. This law was later incorporated in the platform of the Liberal Party, Regeneración calling in November of 1910 for the distribution of unproductive land to those who would use it, with compensation to the owners. With a betterment of the conditions of labor on the other side, prosperity would indeed be real.

One of the most important of the early projects for agrarian reform and the one which most completely foreshadowed the actual direction which the reform finally took was made by Luis Cabrera in October, 1912. Cabrera felt that the agrarian problem could only be solved by restoring the ejidos to the villages. Only in this way could large numbers be benefited and a system of land tenure familiar to the natives be maintained. He further stated that the slow process of legal revindication could accomplish nothing; the ejidos must be returned by outright expropriation and for this purpose Madero should be empowered to declare all private property necessary for the restitution of the ejidos subject to seizure on the grounds of public necessity. Although the Liberal Party, as interpreted by the Magón brothers and their group, went even further by holding that "private property in land is based on crime, and, by that very fact, is an immoral institution," it did give full support to Cabrera's program. Regeneración wrote:

It is the agrarian question; the land question; the question of who shall own the resources of a wonderfully rich and charming country. It is the most serious problem conceivable, for it plants right in the center of the world's stage the social problem in its grimmest, most revolutionary, most uncompromising aspect. Over the question of whether this magnificent earth of ours is for use by all or for sale to a few the battle rages. . . . The Mexicans want back their lands; have no money to buy them back; do not believe in buying them back; assert, with weapons in their hands, that the lands belong to them, whatever lawyers and paper title deeds may say. Practically the Mexicans are speaking as one man, and the proof of it is that no politician, no political party, dare come before the people of Mexico today without making bold and liberal promises to give them back their land.
Cabrera and the Reform Party he represented were unsuccessful. Madero, caught up in a web of compromise and indecision, and surrounded by conservative and die-hard leftovers of the Díaz regime, could not see much beyond his program for political reform. Some progress was made, however. Madero organized the National Agrarian Commission to study the land problem and report recommendations. An Agrarian Executive Committee, composed of three members, was designated to carry out the program. Provision was made for the purchase of private estates and the division of the land for cash or credit sale to farmers. The Department of Loans for Irrigation and Development of Agriculture was reorganized and its activities extended. Attention was also paid to the restoration of the ejidos, municipal councils being authorized to survey and occupy the alienated village lands. Although the state governors were ordered to cooperate in the recovery of these lands and to protect them from encroachment by neighboring proprietors, in the states of Chihuahua and Coahuila land reform was successfully thwarted by the hacendados, including members of Madero’s own family. An attack was also made by the administration on the national lands. The National Agrarian Commission was directed to survey and recover illegally alienated national lands; these were to be divided into lots and sold or rented to Mexican nationals. Seven agricultural experiment stations at selected points throughout the country were established, as well as model farms, irrigation projects, and a large dam in Hidalgo. Several public work projects were also initiated. But the concrete net result of Madero’s half-hearted attempts to deal with the agrarian problem was next to nothing. Referring to the work of the Agrarian Commission, González Roa commented that “the Madero government placed the solution of the rural problem in the hands of those who were not interested in solving it. With their habitual diplomacy, the conservative classes did not deny the existence of the problem but, recognizing it, in practice they succeeded in making the new situation serve their own purposes . . . .” Regeneración went even further when it stated that “no system of agrarian laws can be adopted in Mexico. Legal measures cannot solve a problem which . . . is social and has no political end in view. The social problem can be solved only by each and all taking possession of that which belongs to all.”

Evaluating the Madero rebellion with the benefits of hindsight and perspective, one can see that ideologically it was European and American rather than Mexican. It concentrated almost entirely upon the ideals of political freedom and equality—those ideals written
into the Constitution of 1857 which had always remained inappli-
cable. In its attempt to achieve effective suffrage and no-reelection,
the Madero revolt failed to represent the basic needs and immediate
demands of the Mexican people. The social structure and the tra-
dition of government in Mexico were such that to fight a revolution
for political democracy was to reveal merely a complete dependence
on foreign political philosophy and an ignorance of cultural equali-
ty and social cohesion in Mexico necessary for such democracy.
Madero failed to realize that Mexico remained a conquered nation
_in 1910—conquered by rich Mexican latifundistas who were as op-
pressive as their Spanish predecessors of a hundred years before. He
also failed to recognize that the accepted constitutional forms pre-
valent in the United States were inadequate for social change in
Mexico. The country was not ready for political democracy, but it
was ready for social reconstruction. Such reconstruction depended
at the time upon the use of direct force and centralization of power
in favor of the common people, much as Diaz had used centraliza-
tion and force in favor of the upper classes.\footnote{30} Because of his failure
to act, Madero lost the support of the peón and the laborer who
were asking for land, schools, water, and the abolition of serfdom—
not for democracy or for a voice in the government. Although the
Madero revolt had the great merit of setting afoot the agitation that
made further revolutionary developments possible, it was, on the
whole, utopian in its outlook and tragically quixotic in its achieve-
ments. It was only by the accident of time relationship that the so-
cial policies embodied in the Constitution of 1917 grew out of the
Madero revolution of 1910.\footnote{31}

The first crystallization of the real aims of the struggling masses
of people in Mexico was Emiliano Zapata’s Plan de Ayala, publish-
ed within a month after Madero assumed office.\footnote{32} The Plan disa-
vowed the leadership of Madero who “did not carry to a happy end
the Revolution so gloriously initiated;” it denounced him as a trai-
tor who upon achieving power had forgotten his promises to the
people, and called for his resignation. It was essentially agrarian and
local in its ideas of reform, demanding immediate peasant occupa-
tion of the lands which had been taken from them.\footnote{33}

Let Señor Madero—and with him all the world—know that we
shall not lay down our arms until the ejidos of our villages are re-
stored to us, until we are given back the lands which the hacien-
dados stole from us during the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz, when
justice was subjected to his caprice. We shall not lay down our
arms until we cease to be the unhappy tributaries of the despotic
magnates and landholders of Morelos. . . \footnote{34}
For those individuals who had neither lands nor titles to lands, the Plan proposed the expropriation of private properties "to the end that the pueblos and citizens of Mexico may obtain ejidos,colonies, fundos legales, and crop lands." The owners of such properties were to be previously indemnified to the extent of one-third of the value of the land taken. While Zapata's Plan was hardly a program of agrarian reform or a well-integrated plan of action, as a battle cry and as a statement of revolutionary sentiment it was much more realistic and closer to the hopes and aspirations of the peasants than Madero's slogan of effective suffrage and no-reelection. The Plan de Ayala became the basis for Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917, and Zapata "stands today as the most powerful single influence in the shaping of the agrarian program of the revolution." He is a symbol of agrarismo in its purest and finest form.

The first significant land law published under revolutionary auspices occurred in the state of Durango in October, 1913. Its author was Pastor Rouaix, provisional governor of the state. The law, a political measure of the Revolution, was actually limited and conservative. It gave each village the right to ask for land, provided that the village would agree to pay for the land within ten years, as well as for the cost of surveying it. The value of the land was to be determined by a special board of assessors upon which both the villagers and the land owners were to be represented; the latter were to have at least 12,500 acres left after the expropriation. Conservative as this law was, it is still important as being the first of the land laws of the Revolution.

The next important step in the program of agrarian social and economic reform did not occur until January, 1915, when Carranza decreed a general land law. The measure enacted was a forced one, in that the decree was issued by Carranza only after he had been driven to Veracruz by Pancho Villa and Zapata. This decree has become the legal basis for the distribution of land, and is significant both as a stimulus to, and a limitation upon, the agrarian movement. It made no attempt to deal with the complicated agrarian problem as a whole. The plantation system—the haciendas with their peones de campo—were outside the provisions of the law, which did not contemplate the dismemberment of large estates. Thus over one-half of the rural population of Mexico was beyond the reach of this law, which concentrated upon the restitution to the villages of land which had been illegally taken away from them. Proof of illegal deprivation had to be furnished by the villages. The law
created a National Agrarian Commission, with a cumbersome system of committees, which served only to further delay the execution of the program. It gave the state governors the right to make provisional grants to villages to be later confirmed by the national government. Within a year, however, this power was taken away from the local authorities, practically bringing land distribution to a standstill. The power of the state governors to grant provisional holdings was not restored until November, 1920. A month later the provision for restitution as the basis of solution of the land problem was modified to the point of declaring that every demand for restitution which could not easily be satisfied because of lack of proof or title might be converted into a demand for donation. After five years of trial, therefore, the breakup of the large haciendas came nearer to recognition. Another serious limitation of the Decree of 1915 was the declaration that only villages which had *categoría política* had a right under the law to petition for restitution of lands. It enumerated such villages as *pueblos, rancherías, congregaciones*, and *comunidades*—names which did not represent a definite type of community. In some states these names were almost non-existent, and classification of various villages revealed hundreds of various characterizations. Many villages, by accident of having a different classification, were thus denied the benefits of Carranza's law. The handicap of *categoría política* was not removed until April, 1927, when the scope of the law was broadened to include villages in general rather than certain very specific and comparatively few villages in the country. The law of 1927 declared instead that all villages having twenty-five agrarian families were qualified to ask for land. The basis of land distribution was therefore shifted from the rectification of an injustice to the recognition of a right to land as a matter of social policy. *Acasillados*—resident plantation laborers—were still excluded from the benefits of the law, however. Lastly, the law of 1915 made it possible for the landowners to resort to the courts against the actions of all the officials involved in the process of land distribution; even the final action of the president could be delayed or set aside by a court injunction. Land reform thus became a long-drawn-out matter, subject to time, expense, and many legal delays. It was not until February, 1932, that the Mexican Supreme Court declared itself incompetent to intervene by injunction in the distribution of land under the *ejido* legislation. Carranza, in effect, had attempted to carry out agrarian reform within the existing legal framework, despite the social revolution that had been fought to change it.
The agrarian revolution also expressed itself in other ways, with effects broader than would be indicated by a mere tabulation of the amount of land distributed or the number of villages benefited. Wages in the rural districts increased, and although prices also rose, on the whole the standard of living of the rural population improved. More significant was the practical disappearance of the debt system. This change in the position of the plantation peón freed in one stroke approximately half of the rural population of Mexico—an emancipation comparable in importance to the abolition of slavery in the United States. In addition to his freedom from inherited debt, the economic status of the hacienda peón was definitely improved by the abolition of the tienda de raya. This gave the peón access to free and competitive markets, generally abolished payment in kind, especially pulque, corn, and candles, and freed him from the "token coin" with a limited circulation.

The Revolution has also given rise to an elaborate system of agricultural labor law which, although having no large or immediate significance in governing the life of the agricultural laborer, does provide a promise and a threat for the future. The reasons for the failure of the law to find immediate application involves the whole scheme of Mexican political and economic life. Its enforcement would make the economic organization of the hacienda untenable, and rather than have the labor law applied, the planter has found it cheaper to lose some of his land instead. Another important result of the Revolution has been the reversal of the tendency of the free villages to disappear. This has been manifested in the increase of non-plantation communities and the result has been to give the hacienda laborers a sense of permanence. The Revolution in the rural districts has also stimulated organization among the villages in several states, making them factors both actual and potential in the political equilibrium of Mexico. These village organizations, known as Ligas de Comunidades Agrarias, have had significant long-run influence from a social and political point of view. At their annual conventions these ligas bring together the isolated villages, with their own elected leaders and with a sense of power and an armed militia to maintain the power. Finally, the agrarian revolution has given the states of Mexico the legal right to break up the large haciendas by imposing a limit to the area that any one individual may hold, forcing the sale of the rest. These rights were delegated to the states by Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917; although they have been written into law in a number of states, the haciendas continued to resist dismem-
berment. Lacking a large agricultural middle class in Mexico, there was no one to fill the gap between the hacendado and the peón, especially as the latter had neither money, tools, nor credit with which to begin. If outright revolution had made the peón's escape from serfdom possible, only outright expropriation of the haciendas by state or national legislation would secure the freedom for him and give it meaning. 40

The fountainhead of the agrarian reforms emanating from the Revolution was the Constitution of 1917. Mention has already been made of this all-inclusive document which stands as constant testimony to the sweep of the Revolution as it developed after 1910. Although its adoption took place during Carranza's rule as primer jefe, his action was largely a bid for the support of the people, a campaign to consolidate revolutionary sentiment by introducing reforms that were political in nature. Carranza did not originally plan to give Mexico a new constitution, and much of the honor that would ordinarily be due him for the outcome of his plans must be negative. All of the evidence available, including the draft of the proposed changes in the Constitution of 1857 which he submitted to the constitutional convention, indicates that he had no intention of introducing into the fundamental law of the land any of the radical social and economic doctrines which eventually came to distinguish the Constitution of 1917. Article 27 as it appears in the Carranza draft, while containing some provisions for agrarian reform, was rather narrow and conservative in conception. Article 123, which embodies the present labor program, was entirely missing; the only reference to labor was a suggestion that under Article 73 the federal Congress be given the authority to legislate on labor matters. The basic principles for social and economic reform that the Constitution contains must be credited to men and events in the constitutional convention itself rather than to the leadership of Carranza. That Carranza accepted the changes made in the original document which he submitted to the convention is to his credit, but not to his glory. 41

Although the Constitution of 1917 has been justly recognized as one of the most important social documents of modern times, the ideas embodied in it were not entirely new nor extremely radical. Most of the conceptions regarding property and the rights of labor had long been accepted throughout the western world. What gave the Mexican constitution its general importance, however, was the number and variety of advanced social and economic doctrines brought together in one place and set down as the basic law of the
country. Mexico, at least in theory, achieved at one bound what
many other countries had been obtaining slowly over a matter of
many years. As far as Mexico was concerned, therefore, many of the
ideas found in the Constitution of 1917 were both novel and radical.
Part of the reason for Mexico's sudden leap in its socio-economic
philosophy must be attributed to the influence of the intense na-
tional and international conflict of the period. The constitutional
convention met when the passions stirred up by World War I were
encircling the globe, when the cry for social justice was greater
than at any other previous time. The common people were demand-
and securing power that they had barely aspired to; labor was
making great strides everywhere, and governments were assuming
extensive control over the economic organizations of their countries.
These broad changes in the social structure of the world did not
fail to leave their impress upon Mexico, and thus, while the
framework of the 1917 constitution is essentially the same as that
of 1857, especially in the political structure of the government, the
additions made to it were of such a nature as to shift the whole
emphasis and meaning of the original document. The World War
in one sense isolated Mexico from the rest of the world, compelling
it to seek spiritual, economic, and social sufficiency within itself.
This isolation, caused by the war, by the revolution, and by non-
recognition of Mexico by the United States and the more important
European countries, led the Mexicans to a national rediscovery of
their own problems and possibilities. In effect, the passions of the
period stirred the nation into an active and positive self-conscious-
ness.42

In addition to outside influences, the constitutional conven-
tion had to cope with the changes wrought in Mexico itself between
1857 and 1917. The Constitution of 1857 had been modeled and
shaped by three major influences, the French Revolution, the Span-
ish Constitution of 1812, and the Constitution of the United States;
it was actually an English, French, and American political document
applied to a feudal socio-economic structure and was, by and large,
enforced and unenforceable. The philosophy which this constitu-
tion embodied, moreover, made it a destructive instrument for the
many Indian corporate groups that have been embedded in the
body politic of Mexico for ages. The denial to corporate bodies of
the right to own property became the legal basis for the despoila-
tion of Indian lands and villages; this in turn was a source of dis-
content leading to the Revolution of 1910. Since it was the promise
of lands that made for the greatest support of the constitutional
cause, the convention of 1917 could no longer sidetrack or ignore this fundamental fact. Neither could the convention ignore the fact that the Constitution of 1857 had, by its emphasis upon individual freedom, made it possible to declare labor organizations, strikes, and agitation for economic improvement contrary to the laws of the land. These influences, taken together, gave the convention of 1917 an entirely different setting and outlook from the one which prevailed when the Constitution of 1857 was created.

To this must be added the influence of various social philosophies upon Mexico. During the Díaz period Mexican intellectuals were under the dominance of Auguste Comte, and it "was in the name of positivism that many of the things which a later generation repudiated were done." But it was also to this positivism that the authors of the social program of the Constitution of 1917 turned for support when they were seeking an intellectual justification for their land and agrarian programs. In Comte's emphasis upon society, and in his subordination of the individual to the organic group, the intellectuals found justification for their platform. The authors of the document felt that the concept of property was erroneous, that individual property was of a social nature because it was society alone that created the right of private property, and it was not the individual that created society. While the writing of Karl Marx, Henry George, Peter Kropotkin, and other authors of social economic literature were known to some of the members of the constitutional convention, they seem to have relied most upon Comte's sociology for their chief support. Thus Article 27 turns to Comte for its justification, thereby recognizing some of the ideas and doctrines that had been generated in Mexico since 1857. Without the comprehensive character and new features of Articles 27 and 123, the Constitution of 1917 would have remained little changed from its earlier model of 1857. However, the principle that society must be before and more than the individual did not become characteristic of the new fundamental law without much bitter struggle. Nor did this struggle cease with the adoption of the constitution.

The Mexican Revolution found its most significant and far-reaching expression in Article 27 of the constitution. Not only has this article conditioned the form and the character of land distribution in Mexico, but from its precepts have been drawn the ideas that have lain at the root of Mexico's major intellectual disputes since its adoption. Oil legislation, legislation governing the use of water, division and ownership of property and natural resources, mining and forestry laws, and laws determining the conditions
under which foreigners may hold agricultural property, are all based upon Article 27 which, generally, undertook to solve three major problems: 1) to define and limit the nature of property; 2) to define the persons and other legal entities having the right to hold property; and 3) to devise a set of principles and procedures for the solution of the agrarian problem. Rectification of inequalities in the distribution of rural property was solved in part by the establishment of a “family patrimony,” to be fixed by each state and subject to no kind of lien, mortgage, or alienation. Ejidos were to be restored, illegally alienated national lands recovered, and the latifundia destroyed through limitations on the extent of private holdings. Communal villages and communal ownership, however, while allowed to retain their ancient rights to hold and exploit land, waters, and forests in common, were to be of a temporary character and to last only “until such time as the manner of making . . . division is determined by law.”

In effect, Article 27 attempted to create a variety of new legal forms of landholding, to develop a formula that would meet the special social and legal needs of the multifarious groups of different cultural levels that made up the Mexican community. A functional concept of property rights was needed that would be broad enough to include the primitive notion of ownership characteristic of the wandering Indian groups. Instead of seeking to impose a single theory upon a society in which in fact a wide range of forms of landholding and perceptions of property rights exist side by side, the authors undertook to devise a realistic formula recognizing all forms of property concepts: those of the wandering Indians knowing only the ownership based on temporary occupation; those of communal groups holding their land collectively; and those of ordinary private individuals, or modern corporate ownership. The formula favored the small land owner against the large one, the native against the foreigner, and the individual against the corporation. The emphasis fell upon use and exploitation, to be subordinate to the public interest at all times. Although Article 27, in the extremely wide powers which it grants to the nation, provides for the development of almost any conceivable system of landholding, and although it definitely qualifies the traditional understanding of private property, it nevertheless falls far short of the complete socialization or nationalization of real property. The attitude toward property may be described as “conditional ownership” — ownership in a variety of forms existing side by side, limited in different ways, but meeting the general requirements of public interest. Above all, private property was still the point of
departure and the ultimate goal. In approving the right of villages to hold land collectively, the framers of the constitution did not set out to establish a form of land tenure in opposition to private property. It was rather a question of recognizing the social necessity of giving legal status to the only kind of property familiar and comprehensible to one rather backward section of the population. The *ejidos* would serve as bridges over which the Indians might eventually pass to private lands. Whereas complete socialization in regard to national waters and the subsoil was in theory almost reached, when it came to applying the same logic and philosophy to the surface of the land, the leaders faltered and finally compromised. The result was almost two decades of incomplete, mediocre, zigzagging reform.

Article 27 represents the greatest step forward in Mexico's agrarian reform program to date, however. The right of villages to petition for land solely on the evidence of need is a definitely recognized part of the agrarian program. Moreover, where a petition for the restitution of lands fails for lack of proof, the procedure of outright grant is automatically involved. The range and amount of properties subject to expropriation was greatly extended by the constitution. Finally, it settled once and for all the question of what it meant by *ejidos*.

While agrarianism formed the base of the social revolution in Mexico, the role of labor also was an integral force in determining the motivation and the outcome of the movement. The labor movement, as a part of the Revolution, antedated the Madero uprising by three years. It began with a strike by the workers in Río Blanco, Puebla, and the cry, "Down with Porfirio Díaz. Long live the workers' revolution!" The answer was a bloody massacre, but the original battle had been fought, and the first social impulse had been set traveling through the country. Trade unionism, of course, had been quite unknown in Mexico in the nineteenth century. Still the working classes, in spite of the almost insuperable difficulties that faced them, had desperately attempted to achieve some form of organization. These early attempts took the form of mutualist societies, but were in reality little more than sick and death benefit associations. In Mexico, however, mutualism was looked upon as the only recourse the working man had for personal protection and for any improvement of his condition.

Socialist doctrines began to filter into the country by the beginning of the twentieth century. Spread by a small group of intellectuals, many of whom were foreigners residing in Mexico, these hitherto new and radical doctrines stirred up great disaffection with Díaz and his dictatorship, and also with the ineffective
mutualist societies themselves. The principal centers of discontent and labor agitation were in Yucatán, Mexico City, and Guadalajara, in the state of Jalisco. The result of this awakening among Mexico’s growing industrial laboring class was manifested in such bloody strikes as that which occurred at the Green-Cananea copper plant in Sonora, when American troops were called in to do the shooting. The strike in Río Blanco, also bloodily suppressed, has been mentioned. The Flores Magón brothers, through their newspaper Regeneración, played an important role in awakening Mexico’s laboring class from their fatal neo-feudalistic sleep. Antonio I. Villarreal, working for Regeneración in 1910, gave the following advice to this serfbound class:

The best hope for Mexican laborers is in the Union movement. Unionism will not only improve the standard of living of the Mexicans, it will also put a stop to the degrading humiliations and irritating outrages heaped upon our race. To join the unions is for the Mexicans not only an act of legitimate convenience; it is an act of manhood and dignity and duty to themselves.50

There could never be any bond of friendship or fraternity between “Capital, Authority, the Clergy,” and the working classes, Regeneración held, because the possessing class was always bent on “perpetuating the economic, political and social system that guarantees it the tranquil enjoyment of its robberies,” while the working class endeavored to “destroy this iniquitous system and put in its stead a method whereby the land, the houses, the machinery of production and the means of transportation may be for the common use.”51

Madero did not go that far in his labor reform program, but he did give the problem close attention. His victory over Díaz in 1910 resulted in a riot of labor organization throughout Mexico. Secret political clubs formed in the period of the Díaz dictatorship disappeared while unions of workers emerged to take their place. The need for secrecy and caution in labor organization seemed finally to be removed, and workers were free to meet, talk, organize, and strike without government opposition or repression. Although the law against organizing unions remained unchanged, the Madero government interposed no obstacles to their open formation. This, to the workers, was the visible and tangible symbol of the change which had occurred. Madero’s program was not merely a negative one, however. A National Labor office was created which helped settle seventy strikes within an eight month period, established minimum wages, a ten hour day, and workmen’s compensation
benefits. In addition, provisions were made for overtime pay, legal holidays, medical and educational benefits, prohibition of company stores, minimum age for child labor, severance pay, and payment of wages only in national currency.52

Such measures as these only served to intensify the socialist propaganda of the radical reformers. Every kind of social theory the Mexican workers had ever heard was embraced. Some of the unions that were formed at this time were mutualist in character, as this was the type that was still most familiar to the Mexicans; others professed syndicalist, socialist, anarchist, or communist doctrines. In almost every case, however, the newly created organizations were without definite aims and without any clear understanding of the place they should fill in the life of the worker.53 Typical of the vague, indefinite measures which served only to stir up class hatred in Mexico, is the following appeal from the pages of Regeneración:

We must appeal to the workers, and those wise and generous spirits who sympathize with the workers, since there are no others to whom we can appeal. The revolution in Mexico is a war of the poor against the rich, and the rich, as a class, together with those who consider their interests identified with the rich, are all against us.54

The program of Regeneración, in fact, was already developing into one of unyielding anarchism and hatred of authority that would probably lead to outright chaos in Mexico had it been applied. What Mexico needed at this time was a strong central government capable of restoring order and directing needed reforms. The Liberals, on the other hand, would be satisfied with nothing less than complete expropriation of the means of production into the hands of the people:

... we must not confine ourselves to taking possession of the land and implements of agriculture. The workers in all industries must resolutely take possession of them, so arranging things as that the land, the mines, the factories, the workshops, the foundries, the cars, the railroads, the shipping, the warehouses and the houses may remain in the possession of each and every one of the inhabitants of Mexico, without distinction of sex.55

In the years immediately following the Revolution, a period of experimentation in labor organization developed. It was a period of preparation for the creation of more enduring groups. Leaders were wholly untrained and the masses of the workers were entirely undisciplined. The organizations that were created at this time proved to be of such a loose and casual character that definite action was impossible. There were many strikes, but they were
THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION OF 1910

always the result of purely local conditions. If they resulted in
gains at all, such gains affected only small and isolated groups.
The blind drawing together of the working class did not result
in gains for that class as a whole. Activity, generally was confined
almost entirely to urban workers. The agricultural laborers were
still outside the organization movement except in such military,
direct action endeavors as that led by Zapata. Finally in 1912,
out of this chaos of organization, there came the first group to
give coherence to the labor movement, the Casa del Obrero Mun-
dial, or House of the Workers of the World.56

The Casa was the dominating factor in the Mexican labor
movement from 1912 to 1918. It was not a labor union in any
sense of the word, but its service to later union development in
Mexico was inestimable. The Casa served as a meeting place where
ideas were exchanged, compared, and developed, where propaganda
was prepared, and from which it was disseminated to all parts of
the country. It was the first co-ordinating factor in the labor move-
ment and the training school of the early leaders. These men
felt that social and economic changes were of great and urgent
importance if Mexican workers were to be led out of the confusion
which freedom so suddenly conferred upon them. Like other early
labor organizations in Mexico, the Casa owed much to the efforts of
foreign leaders and agitators, such as Juan Francisco Moncaleano,
who had been expelled from Spain because of his radical doctrines.
There were also many Mexicans among the leaders of the new
group, some of whom later became important national figures.
Among them were Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama, later one of the
founders of the National Agrarian Party, Celestino Gasca, a prom-
inent revolutionary general, Lázaro Gutiérrez de Lara, Manuel
Sarabia, Pioquinto Roldán, and Rafael Pérez Taylor, author of
the first labor union pamphlet, El Sindicalismo.

Dominated at its inception by anarchist-syndicalist beliefs, the
Casa was dedicated to a policy of non-political, direct, and even
violent action, with emphasis on the general strike and sabotage.
This policy seemed to offset the earlier tendency of the unions to
lean upon the government, and to protect their interests through
legislation. The direct action phase did not persist, however. With
political agitation and political discussion rife in the country,
the Casa soon found itself drawn to political action. To have re-
frained from such action would have been difficult in any country,
but in Mexico, where politics was considered the only road to
advancement, it was out of the question.

Neutral as Madero was toward the labor movement, he did
oppose the Casa to some extent, fearing its radicalism and the
introduction into Mexico of foreign influence and doctrines. But while the Madero government had only passively suppressed the Casa, the Huerta regime which followed it returned to a policy of definite and complete suppression of union activities altogether. If, under the Madero regime, labor in Mexico was largely passive and neutral, in the Huerta struggle it was bitter and resentful. Conscious and organized, and with a fairly definite plan of action, labor joined in the Constitutionalist revolution under Carranza. 57

Carranza had made no bid for the support of the working classes when he issued his Plan of Guadalupe on March 26, 1913. Avoiding the mention of social reform, he expressed only repudiation of Huerta and made no pretense of representing the radical elements which held social reform to be imperative. It was not until he had been forced out of Mexico City by the combined forces of Villa and Zapata that he finally stated his social and economic program. On December 12, 1914, in Veracruz, Carranza issued his famous decree which, together with Obregón’s influence with the working classes, secured for him the active aid of the organized labor movement as represented by the Casa del Obrero Mundial. Members of the Casa now put their full support behind Carranza; some of them signed a formal contract with his government, organized red battalions, and fought in the trenches against Villa. For this the primer jefe allowed them to organize behind the lines, and slowly to develop a prestige and leadership that has in the main continued since. 58

Carranza’s decree of 1914 was the first definite recognition of the direction which the Revolution had assumed, a formal announcement that mere political change by the conferring of suffrage upon the mass of the people would not suffice. It was also an announcement that he needed popular support. Together with his agrarian decree of 1915, this decree formed the basis upon which the new regime was to be built. The most significant portion of Carranza’s pronouncement promised that “measures necessary to give satisfaction to the economic, social, and political needs of the nation,” would be undertaken by the executive in order that the equality of the Mexicans among themselves would be guaranteed. He also promised “legislation to better the condition of the peasant, of the worker, of the miner, and in general, of the working classes. . . .” 59

These rather reluctant and forced promises were not carried into effect immediately. Inflation struck the country soon after Carranza’s return to Mexico City. Wages remained stationary, and in the majority of cases conditions of work were much as they...
THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION OF 1910

had been for centuries. Throughout the latter part of 1915 and the first months of 1916, the workers were exceedingly restless; strike followed strike in swift succession all over the country. The workers' organizations were by no means certain of their position, but as long as the strikes were directed against private concerns the government did not actively interfere. When the depreciated paper currency of the country became one of the principal causes of discord, however, Carranza's action was both prompt and drastic. By the spring of 1916 the condition of the workers was desperate, and criticism of the government became so severe that the lower classes were ready for revolt. Labor all over the country, both in agriculture and industry, was completely disillusioned. As the position of the workers grew worse their strength became greater through organization, and their demands more definite and more threatening, until in 1916 a crisis was reached between organized labor and the government. Another series of strikes broke out, culminating in a general strike in the Federal District on July 31, 1916. To add to the seriousness of the situation, violence was not lacking. The cables which brought electric power into Mexico City were cut and the capital for some days was without electricity. In retaliation, Carranza evoked an old law of January 25, 1862, adopted by Juárez to apply against revolutionists, and extended it to apply to strikers. The law applied the death penalty to those who incited strikes or took part in them, and trials of cases arising under it were to be held in military courts. Carranza justified his action by declaring that he considered the strikes not as directed against employers but against the government and against the interest of the nation. By the fall of 1916, however, Carranza began to reverse his position. Realizing that organized labor was merely waiting its opportunity to drive him from power, he decreed in October that wages and salaries must be paid in gold or silver or their equivalent in paper, with the value of the paper to be fixed by the government every ten days. A month later he went further, and declared that all business transactions must be carried on, and all wages and salaries paid on a strictly gold basis. He even attempted, unsuccessfully, to fix wages in terms of the wages of 1912. *Regeneración,* commenting on the events of the past year, gave an accurate appraisal when it said that "the Mexican drama is the Drama of a gigantic crime; the disinheritance of a nation by a handful of scoundrels who had carved their way to power by the sword." But labor's revenge was not long in coming. Ironically it was Carranza himself who gave them their opportunity, through the Constitution of 1917.

Article 123, the Mexican Magna Carta for labor, ranks in
importance only with the previously discussed Article 27 in providing the base for social and economic reforms growing out of the Constitution of 1917. Clearly enough, it was not the purposeful doing of Carranza to establish such an all-inclusive charter of freedom for labor; the only thing he asked of the constitutional convention was that the federal government be given the right in Article 73 of the Constitution to pass labor laws for the entire country. When the Constitution was completed, however, it contained not what Carranza had asked for, but a complete and detailed labor code that gave the Mexican Revolution a new and unexpected significance. The social program of the revolution owed much to the exigencies of the conflict that continued to exist between Carranza and Villa. In order to win, Carranza had found it necessary to define the objectives of the struggle, and to draw together in a convention all the elements who saw in the revolution an instrument of change. Nevertheless, the First Chief was unable to conceal his surprise when the convention, composed largely of military men and lawyers, decided that one of the most necessary changes must be national emancipation from foreign control of industry. Therefore these men devised the labor code embodied in Article 123 as a means of defending Mexico and the Mexican from too much foreign exploitation.

There was no precedent in Mexican constitutional law for Article 123. In effect, the article contained a series of concepts and imposed a body of mandates which were entirely new in Mexican legislation. Many of its ideas are of foreign origin, although an examination of it shows that a large part of the article’s program is an elaboration of basic ideas put forward in an earlier document by Carranza. This document, published in Veracruz in April, 1915, did not receive official sanction, and had merely remained a proyecto to be put into effect at some later date. The new ideas embodied in both the document of 1915 and Article 123 were drawn from such countries as Holland, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Australia, New Zealand, and certain states of the United States, and from the philosophies of such individuals as Justice Brandeis, Father John A. Ryan, Justice Higgins of Australia, and Gaston Doumergue, who had laid a similar law before the French Parliament in 1910. Thus the best labor laws in those countries which had modern social legislation were culled and brought together in a single code for Mexico, forming, in fact, a completely new labor code both for Mexico, and for other parts of the world. This resultant code was so elaborate that the convention boasted it had “freed labor,” while one member remarked that it was “the nicest page in the Constitution.”

Regeneración,
however, with its uncompromising anarchistic philosophy thought quite otherwise. According to the editors, any government was an anathema:

Open your eyes, brothers! Let this terrible and painful deception cause you to comprehend that we are right in telling you that if you want to be free and happy, do not overthrow a government to put another in its place, but to fight against all governments, since it is the government that with the bayonets of its soldiers helps the rich to keep us in slavery, and that you also fight against the Church, because she, with her preachments of docility, of resignation, and of terror to a hell that does not exist, impedes that you think and act against the masters; with which she rivets your chains of slaves.  

Even with these relatively new ideas, and the opposition to foreign capital, it would probably have been impossible to embody so broad a statement of social and economic doctrine into the Constitution of 1917 had it not been for the influences of World War I and the rising power of labor all over the world. The War set in motion a series of influences in the shaping of labor legislation, the participation of labor in government, and the socialization of natural resources that culminated in the Russian Revolution, in the Labor Office of the League of Nations, and in Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution.

The introduction of Article 123 was in the form of an enabling act giving jurisdiction over labor legislation to the states instead of the federal congress. It established detailed provisions concerning hours of labor, child labor, overtime work, employer responsibilities, sanitary conditions, minimum wages, and profit-sharing plans. Both workers and employers were given the right to organize collectively, and strikes, boycotts, and lockouts were recognized as legal under certain conditions, that is, if they were peaceful and were attempting to "harmonize the rights of capital and labor." Provision was also made for the encouragement of "institutions of popular insurance, for old age, sickness, life, unemployment, accidents, and others of a similar character." The most novel portions of the article dealt with the establishment of boards of conciliation and arbitration, to consist of an equal number of representatives from capital and labor, and one representative from the government.  

Capital was easily horrified by the new constitution, and protests against Articles 27 and 123 were made both in Mexico and the United States. But labor had not yet won its victory. It took the workers only a short time to realize that the legal rights guaranteed them in the constitution meant nothing if the government in power was determined not to grant such rights. The battle
had not ended with the promulgation of the new constitution; it simply entered upon another phase. The duty of labor became clear. It must support the government, and insist that the fundamental law of the land be applied. The labor story from 1917 onward has been its struggle to gain in some measure, in actuality, the rights already possessed legally. It has resulted in a near-alliance between government and labor, an alliance that has distinguished the Mexican trade-union movement that grew out of Article 123 from similar movements in other parts of the world.66

While the success of the social revolution in Mexico has been measured largely by the effects of its agrarian and labor reforms, its true success will be measured ultimately in the education and enlightenment of its people. To many historians, the fundamental cause of the Mexican Revolution was ignorance, and the major fruit of victory was the recognition of the rights of the Indian, the peasant, and the laborer to enlightenment and culture.

The Constitutional Convention of 1917 faced the challenge of forging a nation out of many diverse racial and cultural groups by establishing a national system for education suited to a country that was both rural and backward. Rather than impose a foreign educational system upon Mexico, the members of the convention sought to meet the problem precisely on the level where it presented the greatest difficulty and challenge — the rural level. They grounded their basic philosophy of education on the fact that Mexico was a rural country, with needs and wants that were suitable to its rural tempo of life.67

The basis of the present day school system in Mexico is Article 3 of the Constitution of 1917 (revised by the convention of the National Revolutionary Party at Querétaro in October, 1933). This article provided for free instruction in all public institutions, the aim being to “combat fanaticism and prejudices by organizing instruction and activities in a way that shall permit the creation in youth of an exact and rational concept of the Universe and of social life.” Education was to be both socialistic and secular, with only the nation imparting primary, secondary, and normal education. Private schools would be allowed only if they were secular and if they conformed completely with the premises laid down in Article 3. Primary education in all cases was obligatory.68

The schools growing out of Article 3 were socialistic, revolutionary, and, in a sense, proletarian in outlook. Their aim was to accelerate the process of cultural, social, and economic development among the people, “to bridge the gap of time by becoming active agents in the process of social change.” It was for the masses of the people, and for the unification and nationalization of these
masses for their benefit and in their interests, that the new anti-
aristocratic schools were established. The framers of the constitution
hoped that these schools would create a militant national spirit in
behalf of the cultural and economic sovereignty of Mexico as a
nation. They therefore sought to stimulate an appreciation of
the value of Mexican ideas, Mexican accomplishments, Mexican
institutions, and above all, Mexican culture. By accentuating those
aspects of Mexican life, the schools would serve to imbue their
students with the awareness of Mexico's individuality as a nation.
In contrast to the aristocratic system of education that existed in
Mexico prior to 1920, the new system sought to exercise a levelling
influence that would eventually raise the position of the masses
of people to greater prominence in national life. Majority will,
the democratic ideal — these had been the essence of the Revolution,
and their attainment as a permanent ideal of Mexican life was to
be secured through education. Most important, the schools were
to inculcate beliefs that would stand the test of intellectual and
rational examination by the students. Efforts were made to divorce
the spiritual life of the individual from his daily social and civic
practices, to prevent religious interference with the social, economic,
and cultural well-being of the people.⁶⁹

Although these principal tenets of Mexican education, estab-
lished by such leaders as José Vasconcelos and Ignacio García
Téllez, were the expressed desire for many years, and are still not
an accomplished fact, the program of establishing schools through-
out Mexico has continued on the basis of bringing the ideal and
the real together. Immediately after the promulgation of the con-
stitution, numerous types of schools sprang up in Mexico. They
included urban and cultural missions, "Schools of Action," "Schools
of Work," rural community schools, rural normal schools,
aricultural schools, "Schools of Article 123," established by em-
ployers for their workers and families, secondary schools, and
Indian schools. It is these which have carried forward the revolu-
tion of society and education in general. They are motivated by
one common ideal, an ideal that forms the very cornerstone of
the new social order in Mexico. This is the belief that through
education the Mexican people can and will be redeemed. It is
expressed throughout Mexico by the simple yet powerful saying,
"Educar es redimir" — "To Educate is to Redeem." It is only
through a cultural revolution in Mexico that the reforms so dearly
bought with blood can be secured. The Mexican schools serve as
the agency through which the masses of people may be cultivated
to permanently establish the social and economic reforms of the
Revolution of 1910.⁷⁰
In the final analysis the foremost result of the Revolution of 1910 appears to have been largely a spiritual one, a discovery by the Mexican people of their own dignity and individuality, which they were not conscious of possessing before. This self-consciousness, this feeling of becoming a nation, has been a dominating motive in Mexico’s drive for internal unity. The spiritual change is best seen and is most significant in the new attitude toward the Indian. It is in this respect that the Revolution has borne its greatest fruits, for while the movement which began in 1910 was primarily mestizo-oriented, it has been the Indian who has been re-discovered and re-evaluated by the Mexican people. The consequences of this re-discovery of a race suppressed and abused for over four centuries have been greater than any material benefits gained by the upheaval, for the results have been such as to change the very nature of social, political, and cultural existence in Mexico. By means of revolution, by their determined cry of tierra y libertad — land and liberty — the Indian succeeded in limiting the right of the government to destroy the age-old culture of the races of Mexico. Coincident with this change has been the discovery of the significance of the country as against the former preponderance of the city. For Mexico, this discovery actually meant the transition from a colonial to a national state; for the first time in its history the whole of the country, with all of its social classes, was embraced in the political conscience of the government. A land had slowly and painfully become aware of itself. In the process it lost everything except the conquests of the Revolution. In a very real sense, the Revolution of 1910 was Mexico’s own “agonizing reappraisal.”

6. Regeneración, Época 4, (1910-1918), Los Angeles, California, December 17, 1910.
7. Ibid., September 5, 1910.
8. Ibid., September 10, 1910.
10. Shipman, Mexico’s Struggle Towards Democracy, p. 21.
15. Ibid., September 3, 1910.
16. Ibid., October 29, 1910.
17. Ibid., January 21, 1911.
18. Ibid., December 24, 1910.
19. Ibid., May 27, 1911.
20. Ibid., April 29, 1911.
21. Ibid., June 10, 1911, and August 12, 1911.
22. Ibid., November 16, 1910.
23. Ibid., November 12, 1910.
THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION OF 1910

25. Regeneration, July 5, 1913.
26. Ibid., February 10, 1912.
29. Regeneration, August 9, 1913.
31. Ibid., p. 187.
34. Quoted in Simpson, The Ejido, p. 51. The italics are those of the author.
38. Ibid., p. 206.
39. Ibid., pp. 201-205.
40. Ibid., pp. 212-216; Simpson, The Ejido, pp. 75-97.
42. Ibid., pp. 174-175.
43. Ibid., p. 176.
44. See Simpson, The Ejido, p. 64, for a comparison of Constitutions of 1857 and 1917.
45. Tannenbaum, Mexican Agrarian Revolution, pp. 182-183.
46. Ibid., pp. 189-194.
47. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 196-197.
50. Regeneration, November 19, 1910.
51. Ibid., June 13, 1914.
52. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, pp. 208-228.
53. Clark, Labor in Mexico, p. 17.
54. Regeneration, October 18, 1913.
55. Ibid., January 8, 1918.
60. Regeneration, December 25, 1916.
61. Clark, Labor in Mexico, pp. 35-45.
64. Regeneration, January 13, 1917.
65. For details of Article 123, see Clark, Labor in Mexico, pp. 50-52.
69. Sánchez, Mexico, A Revolution By Education, pp. 103-105.
70. Booth, Mexico's School-Made Society, pp. 21-55. See also Sánchez, Mexico, A Revolution By Education, pp. 105-135. See also George K. Kneller, The Education of the Mexican Nation (New York, 1931), pp. 33-44.