From Indian Nationalism to Pakistan: A Study in the Political Metamorphosis of Mohammed Ali Jinnah

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As a young lawyer and politician, Mohammed Ali Jinnah had impressed his colleague and friend in the Supreme Legislative Council, G. K. Gokhale, as being so free from sectarian prejudice that he would make "the best ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity." Yet Jinnah has made his mark in history as the creator of Pakistan. The story of his conversion from the former position to the latter one is of extreme interest and importance not only for its own sake, but also because in that conversion "the great majority of politically conscious Muslims followed or accompanied him." The precise stages in Jinnah's change of outlook will, perhaps, never be known. His aristocratic demeanor, his severity, and his aloofness did not lend themselves to intimate relationships with his fellow men, so that no record of his innermost thoughts has been made available through the writings of his close friends. Nor did he keep a diary or write an autobiography. Thus the researcher is thrown back upon the few private conversations between Jinnah and others that have been recorded and upon his more numerous, if less personal, speeches and writings that have been preserved. These sources do not paint an altogether satisfactory picture of the steps in the change in Jinnah's position, but they at least provide enough evidence to produce a reasonable facsimile thereof.

Mohammed Ali Jinnah was born either October 20, 1875, or December 25, 1876, in Karachi—even the date of his birth being un-

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certain. His family was not wealthy, but at the insistence of an Englishman, was able to send him to study law in England at the age of about sixteen. Having completed his course of study at Lincoln's Inn and qualified at the bar, Jinnah returned to India in 1896. After a few years of hardship, he emerged with a successful practice in Bombay and the beginnings of a personal fortune. In 1906 he joined the Indian National Congress as the private secretary of no less a figure than Dadabhai Naoroji. Then, in 1909, he was elected the representative of the Muslim constituency of Bombay at the Supreme Legislative Council. It was here that he developed a close friendship with Gokhale and that he received the tribute noted above from that eminent Hindu leader.

Jinnah's early belief in and sincerity for the national—as opposed to the communal—cause is shown by his reluctance to join the All-India Muslim League. He finally did join that body in 1913, but only after its constitution had been altered to accord with the Congress demand for swaraj. Even then he exacted a pledge from the League members who convinced him to join that his loyalty to the larger national cause would not be compromised by his joining.

Jinnah's early feelings with regard to the Hindu-Muslim question are, perhaps, best summed up in his speech to the Sixteenth Bombay Provincial Conference in October of 1916. Here Jinnah states, "I believe all thinking men are thoroughly convinced that the keynote of our real progress lies in the goodwill, concord, harmony and co-operation between the two great sister communities [i.e., the Hindus and Muslims]." He goes on to note that the only question other than cow-killing and street music which presents an obstacle to unity between the two communities is that of safeguards for the Muslims. The Muslims, "rightly or wrongly", insist upon separate electorates to ensure an adequate representation in legislative bodies.

Jinnah urged the Hindus to try to win the confidence and trust of the Muslims. He said, "it is not a question of a few more seats going

4. Ibid., 3.
5. Ibid., 6-7.
6. Ibid., 8, 14.
7. Ibid., 15-23.
8. Ibid., 26.
13. Ibid., 124-125.
to the Muslims or the Hindus." "It is a question... of transfer of power from the bureaucracy to democracy." He concluded the speech on a high note, saying, "Hindus and Musalmans united and firm, the voice of three hundred millions of people vibrating throughout the length and breadth of the country, will produce a force which no power on earth can resist." 

Jinnah's greatest achievement as "Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity" was the Lucknow Pact of December 1916, which he was largely instrumental in creating. Here for the first and only time there was complete accord between Congress and League. The principal features of the agreement were that Muslims were to have one-third of the Indian elective seats in the central legislature and various fixed percentages of seats in each provincial legislature, all elected by separate electorates.

It should be pointed out here that, as has been intimated above, Jinnah did not, at this time, believe in the principle of separate electorates. Nor would he change this view for many years to come. He simply felt that since so many Muslims firmly believed in the principle, in it lay the only hope for Hindu-Muslim unity.

Jinnah's first break with the nationalist movement—but not with nationalism—came in 1920. After the passage of the Rowlatt Bill in late March of 1919, he resigned from the Imperial Legislative Council in protest. He had no more sympathy than the rising Hindu leader, M. K. Gandhi, with the government in this matter, but he could not reconcile himself to Gandhi's methods of combating the British. The first conflict between the two men occurred on October 3, 1920, at the Bombay meeting of the Home Rule League, of which Jinnah was a member and Gandhi, the president. The latter succeeded in having the organization's name changed to Swaraj Sabha, whereupon Jinnah quit the organization. He felt that the change in the name also meant a change in aim from dominion status to complete independence, and he objected to what he felt were the unconstitutional means employed by Gandhi in changing the name.

The second, and more decisive, conflict between the two men came in December of 1920, when Gandhi succeeded in passing his non-

14. Ibid., 126.
15. Ibid., 128.
20. Ibid., 261-265.

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cooperation resolution at the Nagpur session of the Indian National Congress. After speaking in protest, Jinnah severed his ties with that body as well.\(^{21}\)

The reasons for Jinnah's breaking with these two nationalist organizations go much deeper than his lawyer's distaste for unlawful means. (Indeed, Jinnah's biographer, M. H. Saiyid, tells us that Jinnah was not averse to agitation or even revolution.)\(^{22}\) Some of the reasons for the severance of formal national ties are given by Jinnah himself in a letter to Gandhi written in 1920. Jinnah said there that Gandhi's methods had caused "split and division in almost every institution" that Gandhi had approached, "not only amongst Hindus and Muslims but between Hindus and Hindus and Muslims and Muslims." He added that Gandhi's program appealed to the "inexperienced youth," the "ignorant and illiterate," and that it would mean "complete disorganization and chaos."\(^{23}\)

Jinnah amplified his reasons for refusing to go along with Gandhi in a speech delivered on February 21, 1921, the anniversary of Gokhale's death. In this speech he advocated contesting the elections for the legislative councils, if only to pass resolutions which would force the government to disband the councils. He said that he did not like pulling boys out of school only to throw them in the streets. He also expressed disapproval of the khaddar movement and said that if boycott were to be practiced, then the Indians ought to build mills and compete with the foreigners like men.\(^{24}\)

To the foregoing causes for Jinnah's split with the nationalist movement as embodied in the Congress and the Home Rule League must be added Jinnah's personal distaste for Gandhi, whom he called "that Hindu revivalist." Perhaps still another factor was that noted by Nehru in his \textit{Autobiography}, that Jinnah did not fit temperamentally into the new, \textit{khaddar}-clad Congress.\(^{25}\)

Whatever may have been his reasons for withdrawing from the Congress—and those noted above would seem to have been the major ones—Jinnah did not abandon his desire for Hindu-Muslim unity at this stage in his career. Despite the vigorous activity of the

\(^{21}\)\textit{Ibid.}, 266-269.
\(^{22}\)\textit{Ibid.}, 268.
\(^{23}\)Reproduced in \textit{Ibid.}, 264-266.
\(^{24}\)Quoted from a report in the \textit{Bombay Chronicle} in \textit{Ibid.}, 269-279.
\(^{25}\)Quoted in Lal Bahadur, \textit{op. cit.}, 171. The author of this work speculates that another reason for Jinnah's withdrawal was that his ambition had too much competition in the Congress from other able men. This would seem to be out of character for Jinnah who, while he certainly was ambitious, would seem to have been equally unafraid of competition.
Arya Samaj in the 1920's and the increased number of riots between Hindus and Muslims, he continued to believe that the two groups of people could and would be united.

In an interview with the Associated Press regarding the coming League meeting in Lahore in May of 1924, Jinnah expressed his view that there were two questions which were currently agitating the Muslim community: the proportion of representation in the legislatures and the percentage of Muslims in the services of the country. He felt that these questions could only be solved by a spirit of give and take between the Hindus and Muslims. He had come to feel by now, however, that the way in which agreement between the two groups could best be obtained would be through a well-organized League, competent to reach an agreement with the Hindus which would be honorable to both groups.

This new position was, of course, a step in the direction of communalism, but that Jinnah still had the target of Hindus-Muslim unity clearly in his sights was demonstrated by his presidential address to the Bombay session of the League in 1924. Here he urged the Muslims of India to take a fair and practical view of the situation and not to fear the Hindu majority in the country. He said that he did not think it possible that seventy million Muslims could be ruled by the ballot box.

By the beginning of 1927 Jinnah had come to the conclusion that the only possible means of reaching a solution to the communal problem would be through the toning down of the Muslim demands, so on the twentieth of March of that year, a conference of Muslim leaders was held at Delhi under his leadership to examine the problem from all angles. The results of the deliberations which ensued were called the Delhi Proposals. The essence of these proposals was that in any future constitutional scheme, the Muslims would accept a joint electorate with reserved seats if, in return for this concession, Sind were separated from Bombay province and legislatures were established in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan.

These proposals were accepted by the All-India Congress Committee in May, but such a storm of criticism greeted the Committee's de-

27. Bolitho, op. cit., 89.
29. Ibid., 338.
30. Ibid., 368-369.
cision that the union between the two communities was rendered impossible.31

Into this situation came the report of the selection of the Simon Commission. Jinnah wished to join the Congress in boycotting the Commission, but in realizing this wish he had to suffer a schism in the ranks of the League between those who agreed with him in this matter and those under Mohammed Shafi who wanted to cooperate with the Commission. The division was complicated, furthermore, by the fact that the Jinnahites were in favor of a conditional joint electorate while the Shafi group refused to compromise on the principle of separate electorates.32

As a sort of makeweight to the Simon Commission, meanwhile, the Congress called for an All-Parties Conference late in 1927 to frame a swaraj constitution. Jinnah’s half of the League welcomed the move and appointed delegates to it. At the first session of the Conference, between February 12 and February 22, 1928, however, the League delegates grew fearful of losing rather than gaining concessions because of the multitude of petty organizations which were attending and pressing their claims. Consequently, the League delegates never attended the meetings of the Nehru Committee which was appointed to deliberate on provisions for a draft constitution.33 Ultimately, while Jinnah was in Europe, the League withdrew from the Conference altogether.34 Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that the League did not find the Nehru Report completely acceptable. As it affected the communal question, the most important provisions of the Report were: 1.) That separate electorates be rejected, 2.) that there be no reservation of seats for majorities (e.g., the Muslims in Bengal and the Punjab), 3.) that there be reservation of seats for minorities in the provincial legislatures for a period of ten years only, 4.) that any reservations for minorities at the center be in strict proportion to population, and 5.) that residual powers under the constitution be vested in the central government rather than the provinces.35

After Jinnah had returned to India (October 26, 1928),36 a committee was formed under his chairmanship to represent the League at the plenary session of the All-Parties Conference, which was to deliberate on the Nehru Report. The League position consisted es-

31. Ibid., 373-380.
33. Ibid., 198-199.
34. Saiyid, op. cit., 397; Gopal, op. cit., p. 199.
35. Ibid., 409-410; Gopal, op. cit., p. 201.
36. Ibid., 410.
sentially of three amendments to the Report: 1.) That Muslims have a one-third representation at the central legislature, 2.) that the Punjab and Bengal have a representation on the basis of population for ten years, and 3.) that residual powers be vested in the provinces. Jinnah carried these amendments to the subcommittee, but they were rejected there. He then took them to the open session of the Conference, only to have them rejected a second time.

This complete rejection of what Jinnah considered to be really a compromise position, in that he had not, demanded separate electorates, must have been a heavy blow to his faith in the possibility of Hindu-Muslim unity. His despondency can perhaps be seen in the resolution which he drafted to place before the special plenary session of the League in March of 1929. In his desire for unity he had allowed a schism to develop in the ranks of the League. He now tried to reunite the organization and to draw into its fold the other Indian Muslim groups. Consequently, his resolution, containing his famous Fourteen Points, incorporated all of the principal demands which had been made from the various Muslim platforms. The most essential points were those of the Delhi Proposals with the addition of the provision for separate electorates. Although this resolution failed to unite the Muslims, it is important as a step in the change of Jinnah’s outlook from that of a nationalist to that of a Muslim communalist. It shows that, at least momentarily, he had lost faith in the possibility of compromise with the Hindus and was trying to solidify the Muslims around a firmer platform.

The next development to have important repercussions with regard to Jinnah’s political outlook was the series of three Round Table Conferences held in London from November 12, 1930-January 19, 1931; September 7, 1931-December 1, 1931; and November 17, 1932-December 24, 1932. There were no Congress representatives at the first Conference because in February of 1930 the Congress had begun its Civil Disobedience movement. The launching of this movement came as a great shock to all those who had hoped for peaceful negotiations towards the formulation of a constitution, and, incidentally, towards a solution to the communal problem, since that problem would have to be solved before a constitutional settlement could be completed. Jinnah was among this shocked group, but despite his great disappointment, he continued his efforts for a Hindu-

37. Ibid., 417.
38. Albiniri, op. cit., 204.
40. Lal Bahadur, op. cit., 205.
41. Ibid., 203.
Muslim settlement. He and the Agha Khan proffered a resolution to solve the communal problem along the lines of the Delhi Proposals, but they were thwarted by M. R. Jayakar's opposition.\textsuperscript{42}

Gandhi attended the second conference as the sole Congress representative. He proposed a solution to the communal problem which embodied manhood suffrage, a joint electorate, and reserved seats only in provinces where a community composed less than twenty-five per cent of the population. This proposal was, of course, completely unacceptable to the Muslims, and the whole conference broke down over communal discord.\textsuperscript{43} Jinnah was not invited to the third session of the conferences,\textsuperscript{44} and the Congress representatives were also absent. Again, however, communal dissensions held the day,\textsuperscript{45} and the British were forced to apply their own scheme for communal representation.\textsuperscript{46}

The failure of the Round Table Conferences to solve the communal question, coming as it did so soon after the Nehru Report, placed the cornerstone on Jinnah's optimism about Hindu-Muslim unity. As he expressed it later to students at the Muslim University, Aligarh, he had received the shock of his life at the Round Table Conferences because, "in face of danger the Hindu sentiment, the Hindu mind, the Hindu attitude led me to the conclusion that there was no hope of unity."\textsuperscript{47} He was particularly critical of Gandhi's attitude at the second conference. He wrote to Gandhi in March of 1938 that he felt the Hindu leader had equivocated, seemingly willing to accept provisionally certain terms but saying that it would be hopeless for him to do so since the Hindus as a body would never accept them.\textsuperscript{48} Jinnah seems to have felt here—though he does not say so explicitly—that Gandhi, with his great influence, could have swayed the Hindus and particularly the Congress to an acceptance of the Muslim demands had he so desired.

Jinnah's despondency at the outcome of the conferences led him to decide to remain in London and practice at the Privy Council bar.\textsuperscript{49}

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\item \textsuperscript{42} Saiyid, \textit{op. cit.}, 468-477; Albiruni, \textit{op. cit.}, 207.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Lal Bahadur, \textit{op. cit.}, 209-211.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Albiruni, \textit{op. cit.}, 208.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Lal Bahadur, \textit{op. cit.}, 211-212.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Bolitho, \textit{op. cit.}, 98.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Saiyid, \textit{op. cit.}, 591.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Re: Hindu-Muslim Settlement (Delhi: Muslim League Printing Press, 1938), 9-11.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Bolitho, \textit{op. cit.}, 99.
\end{itemize}
return to India in 1934 to pull the League out of its "degraded" state. That Jinnah had not altogether given up hope for Hindu-Muslim unity is shown by his strong plea in a press interview in the Spring of 1934 for the joining together of the two communities into a single nation. In 1935 an opportunity for the implementation of this plea seemed to appear in the form of negotiations between Rajendra Prasad, the president of the Congress, and Jinnah. Once again, however, the bodies represented by the two men, the Congress and the League, could not reach an agreement, and the opportunity was lost.

No further significant changes took place in Jinnah's attitude until after the 1937 elections held under the Indian Councils Act of 1935. Jinnah did not like the new act, particularly in its federal features, and compared it to the Treaty of Versailles. He said, however, that just as the Germans had made the best of that treaty, so India should make the best of the new constitution. He went on to say that the two communities of Hindus and Muslims must unite in resistance to the act and should not rest until it was replaced by a better one.

As a result of these urgings by Jinnah to accept the 1935 act for what it was worth, the League passed a resolution authorizing Jinnah to form a Central Election Board for purposes of coordinating electioneering efforts. Consequently, in June of 1936, Jinnah called together the first Parliamentary Board at Lahore and began preparing for the elections.

When the results of the elections were tallied, the League's lack of mass support became obvious. In 1937 the League was still a middle-class organization which had made little effort to gather support from among the poorer classes, and as a result, it did poorly in the elections. It was routed in all of the Muslim majority provinces except Bengal, and even there it only secured 40 out of the 119 seats reserved for Muslims. Among the Hindu provinces, the League did well only in the United Provinces, Bombay, and Madras. For our purposes, the most important electoral events took place in the first of these provinces.

50. Ibid., 104-106.
52. Ibid., 517-523.
54. Saiyid, op. cit., 541-547.
55. Ibid., 548.
56. Ibid., 554.
57. Symonds, op. cit., 53.
The League was naturally upset at its poor showing in the elections, and fears of Hindu domination in what now seemed a none too distant, independent India were increased. However, the election by itself would not have had the results it did if the Congress had not given further cause for Muslim fears.

In the 1937 elections in the United Provinces, the Congress and the League had arrived at an agreement of mutual help in the campaign. In the elections themselves, the Congress had won no Muslim seats but had garnered enough Hindu seats to form a ministry. The League had won only twenty-seven of the fifty-seven Muslim seats, but on the strength of the pre-election understanding it put forth its claim for a share in the ministry. The Congress agreed to allow League members to join the ministry, but only on the condition that they renounce their ties with the League and join the Congress party.61

The Congress was fully within its parliamentary rights in doing this, of course, but as Sir Percival Griffiths puts it, "there can be little doubt...that it [the Congress] made a grave tactical blunder." With this one blow, the Congress succeeded in completely alienating the one man who was in a position to reconcile the Muslims with the Hindus. Mohammed Ali Jinnah was impeccably honest himself, and for this reason he particularly execrated what he regarded as dishonesty in those with whom he had dealings. He felt that the Congress leaders had gone back on their pledged word in this instance, and whereas he had trusted the Congress heretofore, he would never again do so. He was not yet converted to the idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims, an idea now current in Muslim circles, but he was fast approaching the altar rail. Only two more ingredients now needed to be added before he would speak out in favor of partition.

The first of these ingredients was the acceptance by Muslims, including Jinnah, of the reports of "atrocities" committed against Muslims in Congress-governed provinces. The four principal com-

59. Ibid., 243.
60. Ibid., 247.
61. Percival Griffiths, The British Impact on India (London: MacDonald and Co., 1952), 340. The Congress position on the refusal to form a coalition government with the League was that the only weapon that Congress had to coerce the governors not to use their special powers, given them under the 1935 Constitution, was the threat of tendering the resignation of the ministry, thereby showing that the Constitution was a failure. This threat might not be capable of use in a coalition ministry since there would be no unified party control. See Lal Bahadur, op. cit., 238; Re: Hindu-Muslim Settlement, 66-67.
plaints in this regard, at least as they affected Jinnah, were: 1.) That the Congress forced Muslim children to sing the *Bande Mataram* as a national song, 2.) that the Congress flag was hoisted upon every government and public building as the national flag, 3.) that the Congress was trying to stifle the Urdu tongue and to replace it with Hindi and Hindustani, and 4.) that the Wardha scheme of education was being forced upon Muslim children. 63

Just how much fact there was behind these allegations may never be known because of the emotionalism involved in the charges and countercharges. 64 Probably “atrocities” had been occurring for some time and were equally prevalent in both Hindu and Muslim majority provinces. 65 The general importance of the matter lies not in the truth or falsity of the charges, anyway, but in the fact that Jinnah and other Muslim League members believed that they were true and made political capital of them, almost overnight converting the League from a middle-class to a mass-supported organization. 66 More particularly for the purposes of this study, the importance of the charges lies in the fact that they inclined Jinnah even more towards the goal of a separate Muslim homeland.

The second of the two ingredients noted above which finally did convert Jinnah to a belief in the desirability of partition was the correspondence of Muhammad Iqbal. Between May of 1936 and November of 1937, Iqbal wrote a number of letters to Jinnah concerning the political situation in India. In the two most important of these letters, dated May 28, 1937, and June 21, 1937, Iqbal argued for the creation of a separate Muslim state as the only way to solve the problem of the poverty of the Muslim masses and as the solution to the problem of Hindu-Muslim riots. 67 Iqbal’s arguments did not convert Jinnah immediately to the ideal of Pakistan, but, in

63. Jinnah’s presidential address to the Muslim League session in December of 1938 in Ahmad, *op. cit.*, 75-90. The Wardha scheme of education was the one sponsored by the Congress governments. It had nothing intrinsically offensive to the Muslims in its curriculum, but some Hindu supporters seem to have tried to give the scheme a religious tone in their application of it to the local scene. To this the Muslims strongly objected. For a discussion of this and other complaints of the Muslims see Humayun Kabir, *Muslim Politics (1906-1942)* (Calcutta: Gupta, Rahman and Gupta, 1944), 19-20.


65. On this see Griffiths, *op. cit.*, 341.


Jinnah’s own words, “his [Iqbal’s] views were substantially in con­sonance with my own and had finally led me to the same conclu­sions as a result of careful examination and study of the constitu­tional problems facing India ...” 68

Before Jinnah had been swayed completely by Iqbal’s arguments, one more big attempt was made between Jinnah on the one hand and Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and S. C. Bose on the other to reach a settlement to the communal problem through compromise. The attempt began with a letter from Gandhi to Jinnah on October 19, 1937. By October 10, 1938, the venture had gone the way of so many like it in the past. 69 There are many reasons which can be given for the failure to reach a settlement in this series of letters, but essentially the matter boils down to the fact that Jinnah and the League were no longer disposed to trust the Congress, while the Congress was prepared neither to grant to the League all of the guarantees which it demanded nor to recognize it as the sole representative of Muslim interests. 70 It was primarily on these rocks that the Indian ship of state was cleft in twain.

From the time of the failure of this attempt at unity until the meeting of the Muslim League in March of 1940, no event of impor­tance to the conversion of Jinnah to the belief in partition would seem to have occurred. All the essential chemicals were present; it was merely a question of reaction time. Exactly when the reaction occurred is uncertain. In the fall of 1939 Jinnah told a small group of Muslim students from Cambridge who were in favor of Pakistan that he was becoming more and more convinced that they had the right solution, 71 indicating that he probably had not made up his mind about the matter at that stage. Or perhaps he had already decided and was simply waiting for the proper psychological moment to speak out in favor of Pakistan. 72 Whenever it was that Jinnah did decide to subscribe to the Pakistan proposal, however, in his presidential ad­dress to the All-India Muslim League on March 23, 1940, he finally endorsed the proposal publically, and on that date what came to be called the Pakistan Resolution was officially passed by the League.73

69. See Re: Hindu-Muslim Settlement, passim.
70. For the details of the correspondence see Re: Hindu-Muslim Set­tlement. Of special interest and importance are pages 37-71.
71. de Bury, op. cit., 834.
72. See Gopal, op. cit., 268.
73. Bolitho, op. cit., 127. For the text of Jinnah’s address see Ahmad, op. cit., 159-181.